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Abstract
I show that an advertising ban is more likely to increase - rather than
decrease - total consumption when advertising does not bring about a large
expansion of market demand at given prices and when it increases product
diﬀerentiation (thus allowing ﬁrms to command higher prices). In this case,
the main impact of a ban on advertising is to reduce equilibrium prices and
thus increase demand. I argue that this is more likely to happen in mature
industries where consumer goods are ex-ante (i.e. without advertising) sim-
ilar and advertising is of the ’persuasive’ type. The ban is the more likely to
increase proﬁts of the ﬁrms the weaker the ability of advertising to expand
total demand and the less advertising serves to induce product diﬀerentia-
tion.
JEL Numbers: K2, L13, L66, M37.
Keywords: Advertising, bans, product diﬀerentiation, regulation, tobacco,
alcohol.
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In many countries, complete bans or restrictions on advertising for products
which are often thought of as dangerous or associated to health problems
(such as tobacco and alcoholic drinks) have been advocated. This has led
a number of national governments, especially in OECD countries, to ap-
prove regulations which prevent producers and retailers from advertising
such goods or which restrict their advertising activities to certain media
(for instance by prohibiting television and radio commercials).
The rationale behind such limitations on advertising is that advertising
raises aggregate demand. By banning or limiting advertising, the desired
reduction of consumption would be obtained.
Yet, there is very little evidence that advertising has a positive impact
on the total demand for the goods advertised, either in general or more
speciﬁcally in industries which are more frequently targeted by regulations,
like tobacco and alcoholic drinks. Duﬀy (1996) surveys most of the empirical
works on the eﬀect of advertising on tobacco consumption (among others, see
Baltagi and Levin (1986), Duﬀy (1987), Hamilton (1972), Johnston (1980),
McGuiness and Cowling (1975, 1980), Radfar (1985)) to conclude that such
eﬀect is generally small and/or non signiﬁcant. Among the most recent
studies, the estimates by Nelson and Moran (1995) suggest that the main
eﬀect of alcohol advertising is to reallocate brand sales with small or no
eﬀect on total consumption.
Some attention has also been devoted to the impact upon aggregate de-
mand of the advertising bans introduced in several countries. The results
are surprising. Schneider, Klein and Murphy (1981) ﬁnd that the 1971 US
1ban on broadcast advertising of tobacco products has increased consump-
tion, an eﬀect already predicted by Hamilton’s (1972) study (but see Baltagi
and Levin (1986) for a diﬀerent view). Hamilton (1977) studies the eﬀect of
advertising bans in several countries to ﬁnd no evidence that they decrease
cigarette consumption. Stewart (1993) analyses data of tobacco consump-
tion in OECD countries for the period 1964-1990. He estimates a model of
per-capite tobacco consumption and ﬁnds that the dummy coeﬃcient for the
advertising bans introduced in six OECD countries is positive (even though
not statistically signiﬁcant). Duﬀy’s (1996) survey of studies on advertising
bans concludes that they are an ineﬀective policy instrument since they do
not manage to reduce consumption.
Even if the evidence that bans increase consumption is not conclusive,
the very possibility that an increase rather than a decrease of demand may
follow the introduction of advertising restrictions is puzzling. The explana-
tions given by the authors who have found a positive eﬀect of a ban upon
consumption do not always appear convincing.
Hamilton’s (1972) work on the US suggests that this result is due to the
fact that by banning broadcast advertising on cigarettes, the anti-smoking
publicity has been reduced as well. Actually, the Fairness Doctrine obliged
broadcasters to give a proportion of the time devoted to cigarette advertising
to anti-smoking advertisers for them to air their health warnings (usually the
proportion was roughly one third). Because of the banning of advertising by
cigarette producers, the anti-smoking lobbies have lost the implicit subsidies
which allowed their intensive campaigns about the danger of tobacco con-
sumption. Since Hamilton ﬁnds that anti-smoking publicity is more eﬀective
in reducing consumption than advertising in increasing it, a plausible story
2for the positive eﬀect of the ban on aggregate demand in the US is given.
Schneider et al. (1981) also suggest that the broadcasting ban brought
about a decrease in advertising expenditures of the ﬁrms, which in turn led
to lower cigarette prices and to an increase in demand.
To explain the positive eﬀect of bans on tobacco consumption in OECD
countries, Stewart (1993) argues that by banning advertising one also elimi-
nates the space which is devoted to the health warning (no Fairness Doctrine
exists in the countries he studies). This way, consumers would not be re-
minded of the danger of smoking (see also Duﬀy (1996) for a similar view).
However, this argument disregards the fact that health warnings usually ap-
pear on the cigarette packets as well, so it is hard to believe that it gives a
plausible explanation to the ﬁndings that the ban increases consumption.
The industrial organisation theoretical literature does not seem to oﬀer
much more guidance to understand the eﬀects of advertising bans. To the
best of my knowledge, no paper exists which focuses on this issue. How-
ever, some light can be shed by looking at existing papers on the eﬀects
of advertising on prices and welfare. Broadly speaking, there are two dif-
ferent categories of advertising that can be labelled, somewhat arbitrarily,
informative and persuasive1.
Advertising is informative when consumers get to know the existence of
ﬁrms and their products or the prices they set. Its main eﬀect is to foster
competition, since it allows comparative shopping and therefore tends to
reduce perceived product diﬀerentiation created by lack of information (see
for instance Grossman and Shapiro (1984)). As a result, advertising would
1See Tirole (1988), section 7.3. Obviously, it is often diﬃcult to assign real world
advertising to one of these two abstract categories.
3tend to decrease prices (it might also lead new consumers, otherwise un-
aware of the goods, to buy them), while an advertising ban would increase
prices and decrease consumption. Indeed, there exists some evidence that
this may happen in some sectors. Benham (1972) and Benham and Ben-
ham (1975) ﬁnd that in the US States where advertising for eyeglasses or
optometric visits is not allowed, prices for eyeglasses and visits are higher
than in States where such restrictions do not exist. 2 A similar study, with
more ambiguous results, has been carried out by Stephen (1994) who looks
at the conveyancing fees charged by solicitors in Scotland before and after
de-regulation of advertising in such ﬁeld.
These empirical studies show that in the market for professional services
a ban on advertising tends to decrease demand. None the less, the informa-
tive character of advertising messages in those sectors should be emphasised.
There, the main role of advertising is to inform consumers of the existence of
certain sellers and of the prices they charge. Given their informative nature,
advertising messages are also mainly local (for instance they can be found
on local newspapers, radios, televisions).
However, such circumstances hardly describe advertising in general. For
instance, advertising for consumer goods such as drinks and cigarettes is
usually done at the national level, focuses on the images associated with
certain brand names, and hardly mentions prices. This type of advertising
is of a ”persuasive” nature and its likely eﬀects on prices are the opposite
than those of informative advertising. Persuasive advertising increases brand
2Kwoka (1984) also ﬁnds that advertising does not lead to any decrease in the quality
of the services provided by professionals in such industry. This was the main argument
invoked by professional associations to justify the necessity of advertising bans.
4recognition, enhances loyalty towards the ﬁrm’s products and therefore in-
creases product diﬀerentiation and allows ﬁrms to enjoy more market power.
Hence, it raises equilibrium prices. This would in turn reduce consumption,
unless advertising might also shift outward the aggregate demand function
for any given level of prices. A priori, therefore, the eﬀect of persuasive
advertising upon total demand is ambiguous.
Dixit and Norman (1978) analyse the welfare eﬀects of advertising within
an oligopolistic model where ﬁrms choose advertising and output simulta-
neously. They assume that advertising increases prices3 (i.e., advertising
is ’persuasive’) and ﬁnd that the sign of the impact of advertising upon
consumption cannot be established a priori. 4
Friedman (1983) models advertising expenditures as a capital invest-
ment, with the stock of advertising determining the goodwill level of a ﬁrm,
which in turn aﬀects demand. He also explicitly accounts for the external-
ities that advertising by a ﬁrm can have on its rivals. The sign of these
externalities aﬀects the desirability of a ban from the point of view of the
ﬁrms. For instance, when advertising by a ﬁrm just shifts consumers to
it from rivals without attracting new consumers into the market, advertis-
ing expenditures resemble a prisoner’s dilemma game, and an advertising
ban would beneﬁt the ﬁrms. In Friedman’s model an advertising ban either
decreases or leaves unchanged aggregate consumption. The diﬀerent result
3In their model, the assumption that advertising decreases the ﬁrm’s elasticity of de-
mand guarantees that it raises equilibrium prices.
4Dixit and Norman do not analyse the impact of advertising on ﬁrms’ proﬁts but
they ﬁnd that advertising is socially excessive. This is mainly because a ﬁrm decides
on advertising expenditures by looking at its own proﬁtability only and disregarding the
possible negative externalities imposed upon rivals.
5obtained by Friedman mainly depends on the fact that, unlike Dixit and
Norman, advertising has a weaker impact on prices.5 As I argue below, the
eﬀect of advertising on prices is crucial to determine the impact of a ban
upon consumption.
In this paper I try to investigate more deeply the eﬀects of advertising
bans on consumption. Unlike Dixit and Norman, I do not take sides with
respect to the question on whether advertising is informative or persuasive
and allow for advertising to be of either type (it can either decrease or
increase prices for any given level of aggregate demand). Indeed, I show in
section 2 that the expected eﬀects of an advertising ban depend on the type
of advertising under consideration.
In section 2, I use a general model to study the marginal eﬀect upon
demand of advertising expenditures, under both monopoly and oligopoly.
Advertising has two main eﬀects on market demand. One eﬀect is direct and
I label it expansion eﬀect. It determines the extent to which advertising
attracts new consumers into the market (or expands demand of existing
consumers) for any given prices. The other eﬀect is indirect and I call it
price eﬀect of advertising. It measures how advertising impinges upon
prices, for any given level of demand. In turn, the change in prices will
aﬀect demand.
When advertising decreases prices, and can therefore be likened to ”infor-
mative advertising”, both eﬀects have the same sign. Indeed, the expansion
eﬀect is non-negative by deﬁnition,6 while the reduction in price caused by
5Section 4 of this paper deals with a model which is inspired by Friedman (1983).
There I show the role played by the ”price eﬀect” of advertising in determining the overall
impact of the ban.
6Although it might be possible to ﬁnd examples where advertising decreases aggregate
6advertising would also increase demand. One can therefore conclude that a
ban on advertising would unambiguously decrease aggregate consumption.
When advertising raises prices, as one would expect in the case of ”per-
suasive advertising”, the net eﬀect upon consumption is a priori ambiguous.
The expansion eﬀect is still non-negative, but the price eﬀect works in the
opposite direction. Advertising leads to an increase in prices - ceteris paribus
- and via this channel it decreases demand. It is the relative magnitude of
the two eﬀects which determines the net impact of advertising on consump-
tion. In particular, one would expect a ban to decrease consumption when
the expansion eﬀect is small (advertising does not attract new consumers in
the market) and when the price eﬀect of advertising is strong (for instance,
when advertising increases the perceived degree of product diﬀerentiation
between competing products).
The marginal analysis carried out in section 2 gives many insights as
to the economics of advertising bans. However, it is not the most proper
instrument to study the eﬀects of a complete ban which implies discrete,
rather than marginal, changes in the level of advertising made by the ﬁrms
(aggregate demand might be a non-monotonic function of advertising). For
this reason, in sections 3 and 4 I specialise the analysis and propose two
oligopolistic models of persuasive advertising where the eﬀects of an adver-
tising ban can be analysed in detail. The examples provide an illustration
of the importance of the two eﬀects mentioned above. Also, by resorting to
such examples I will be able to give a full characterisation of the equilibrium
and in particular to analyse what is the likely eﬀect of a ban on the proﬁts
of the ﬁrms in the industry.
demand I disregard them as scarcely realistic and exceptional.
7In the example given in section 3, advertising increases the degree of
product diﬀerentiation and thus the price eﬀect of advertising is quite strong.
I formulate a new model which accounts for the extent to which advertising
also expands aggregate demand. It turns out that there exists a critical
threshold value of the expansion eﬀect of advertising below which this eﬀect
is dominated by the price eﬀect. In other words, the lower the direct impact
of advertising upon demand and the more likely that the ban increases con-
sumption via a price reduction caused by less product diﬀerentiation. Given
that advertising has a key role in relaxing market competition and allowing
ﬁrms to charge higher prices, an advertising ban has in general a negative
eﬀect upon ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Only in the rather extreme circumstances where
ﬁrms are selling products which are ex-ante - that is, even in the absence
of any advertising - highly diﬀerentiated (which implies that advertising is
less useful to relax market competition) and where the expansion eﬀect is
extremely small (that is when advertising tends to attract only consumers
which previously patronised rival products) does the ban increase ﬁrms’
proﬁts.
I believe that the model presented in section 3 illustrates the current
views of practitioners about advertising bans. Indeed, the most widespread
view in tobacco ﬁrms seems to be that an advertising ban would lead to a
price war, thus hurting the ﬁrms but at the same time increasing consump-
tion. In a recent interview, a Philip Morris’ manager has been quoted to say:
”Like most consumer goods, cigarettes are marketed on image...If you take
away that marketing tool, take away the manufacturer’s ability to compete
on image, then price will become the main factor in seizing market share” 7.
7See Rawstorne (1990).
8In a less colourful way one might rationalise these views by saying that an
advertising ban would prevent ﬁrms from creating perceived product diﬀer-
entiation thus making them unable to keep high prices, which in turn might
stimulate aggregate demand. This outcome is captured by the example I
propose in section 3.
Section 4 provides an example where advertising increasesthe consumers’
willingness to pay for the good advertised but does not modify the degree
of product diﬀerentiation between the competing goods. As a result, the
price eﬀect of advertising is less strong than in the previous model and it
never dominates the expansion eﬀect. This results in the ban never in-
creasing consumption. However, the magnitude of the expansion eﬀect still
plays an important role, since the fewer new consumers are attracted into
the market by advertising the less eﬀective the ban in reducing aggregate
consumption. In the extreme case where advertising just shifts consumers
among ﬁrms without attracting new demand, the ban does not change total
consumption at all. The impact of the ban upon ﬁrms’ proﬁts depends on
the expansion eﬀect as well. The stronger the negative externality imposed
by a ﬁrm’s advertising on rival ﬁrm’s demand the more likely that the ban
results in higher proﬁts for the ﬁrms. This situation is similar to a prisoner’s
dilemma game and the ban acts as a device which allows the ﬁrms to reduce
expenditures which they would not unilaterally decrease otherwise.
It has been suggested that this situation occurred at the time of the
introduction of the US ban of broadcasting advertising by tobacco ﬁrms.
According to many observers, prior to the ban tobacco ﬁrms had been in-
volved in heavy expenditures in cigarettes advertising which in the mature
US market did not have the eﬀect of increasing demand but just shifted
9market shares from one ﬁrm to the others. The ban acted as a credible
commitment for the ﬁrms to reduce advertising and to shift away from a
Pareto inferior equilibrium from the point of view of the industry. This
view is conﬁrmed by the fact that the ﬁrms did not oppose to the broad-
casting ban and that their proﬁts and their share prices strongly increased
after the ban.8
In the European Union, the tobacco producers have been lobbying hard
against the imposition of a ban. This can be due to either of the following
reasons. One is that producers have in mind a situation like the one depicted
in the section 3 model, where advertising allows ﬁrms to relax product mar-
ket competition. The other is that section 4 model describes the industry
but spillovers across ﬁrms are positive rather than negative, which amounts
to saying that market demand is perceived as still expanding.
Section 5 concludes the paper with a short summary, a discussion of the
results obtained, and comments upon possible extensions.
2 Advertising and quantities. The general model
In this section, I analyse the marginal eﬀects of advertising on aggregate
demand. First, I study the case of a multi-product monopolist as a bench-
mark case. Then, I turn to the case of an oligopoly. In both cases I assume
that ﬁrms choose advertising levels in the ﬁrst stage of the game, and prices
in the second stage. This is to represent the idea that advertising is usually
associated to a particular marketing strategy which is a longer-run variable
8See e.g. Scherer (1980, pp.386-9).
10than market decision variables such as pricing of products. 9 In both cases
the utility function of the representative consumer is given by:
U = y + φ(q1,...,qn;I1,...,In), (1)
where y is a composite good, qi is the i-th good whose market we want
to study and Ii is the investment in advertising of the i-th good. From the
maximisation of the utility of the consumer we obtain the following system




, i = 1,..,n. (2)
We also assume that it is possible to invert this system so as to obtain
the direct demand functions as follows:




I limit my attention to the case of demand substitutes, and therefore
assume that ∂qi
∂pj > 0, with j 6= i. Throughout the paper I also assume that
∂qi
∂Ii ≥ 0, whereas
∂qi
∂Ij can be either positive or negative.
2.1 Multi-product monopoly
Consider a monopolist who is producing n goods at zero production costs
and faces a cost function of advertising C(Ii) identical for each good, without
9In the case of a monopolist, it makes little diﬀerence to assume that decisions are
sequential rather than simultaneous. It is not so, in general, when oligopolistic ﬁrms are
analysed.








where p and I are respectively the vector of prices and the vector of adver-
tising levels, and where pi(I) is already written as a function of advertising
levels to take into account the proﬁt-maximising choice of price by the mo-
nopolist for given advertising levels. The monopolist’s optimal choice with














If we focus on the symmetric case where pi = pj = p, the above condition





dIi and shows that a necessary condition
for the monopolist to advertise product i is that the overall impact on ag-
gregate demand be positive. In other words, for any given price level, the
increased demand for good i should outweigh the possible reduction in the











The marginal eﬀect on total consumption given by an additional unit of






































The overall impact of advertising on total consumption is given by two
eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect consists of the price (or indirect) eﬀect of advertising.
For any given level of aggregate demand, increasing the level of advertising










The second eﬀect is given by the expansion (or direct) eﬀect of adver-
tising. For any given level of prices, increasing the level of advertising aﬀects










∂pj < 0, a standard assumption. Since from the proﬁt-
maximising conditions of the monopolist the second term in the sum above
is positive, it is straightforward to see that a suﬃcient condition for
dQ
dIi to




∂Ii is negative. In other words, if advertising tends
to lower the prices of the goods sold by the monopolist, then it will certainly
increase demand.10
If instead advertising tends to increase the equilibrium prices of the goods
sold, then the eﬀect on aggregate demand is a priori ambiguous. Total quan-
tity increases with an additional unit of advertising only if the direct eﬀect
given by the expansion of demand at given prices more than compensates
the indirect eﬀect brought about by the price increase.
10This also implies that advertising may be proﬁtable not because it lowers the elas-
ticity of demand, but because it raises the level of demand. This point has been rightly
emphasised by Becker and Murphy (1993, p.955).




∂Ii is reminiscent of the distinction between
informative and persuasive advertising. When this term is negative, adver-
tising lowers prices in the market, which is also the eﬀect one would expect
from informative advertising. When the term is positive advertising tends
to raise prices, as persuasive advertising would be likely to do. Admittedly,
this is a rather crude way to express informative and persuasive advertising.
For instance, one might want to associate them with some explicit features
in consumers’ preferences rather than in the reduced form they appear here.
None the less, I will often use the terms ”informative” and ”persuasive”
advertising in the sense described above throughout the paper, mainly for
evocative reasons.
Note also that the sign of each derivative needs not be the same. For
instance, advertising by ﬁrm i might raise its own price (∂pi/∂Ii) while
lowering rivals’ prices (∂pk/∂Ii, for k 6= i). We assume that the eﬀect on the
own price is stronger than the cross eﬀects, so that the overall price eﬀect
takes the sign of the own price eﬀect.
To conclude, even under monopoly it is conceivable that a (marginal)
restriction on advertising could expand total demand. As just discussed, this
occurs when advertising is mainly made to increase the willingness to pay
of consumers (persuasive advertising) but has little impact on the aggregate
demand of consumers at given prices.
2.2 Oligopoly
I now turn to the case of an oligopolistic industry with n ﬁrms whose demand
schedules are given above. For simplicity, assume that the n products enter
the demand function of consumers in a perfectly symmetric way, and that
14the ﬁrms have identical technologies. Like for the monopoly case, I assume
away production costs for simplicity and without major consequences for
our qualitative results. The proﬁt function for the i-th ﬁrm is given by:
Πi = pi(I)qi(p(I),I) − C(Ii), (9)
where pi(I) is the equilibrium price for given vector of advertising levels.

















Whereas a necessary condition for the monopolist to advertise was that
advertising increased aggregate demand at given prices, an oligopolist might








To ﬁnd the total eﬀect of advertising by ﬁrm i on aggregate consumption,



















where the assumption of symmetry has been used. This expression is fun-
damentally the same as for the multi-product monopolist, even though the
direct eﬀect on aggregate demand can be nihil under oligopoly. Indeed, a




∂Ii = 0, since it does not
take into account the possible negative externalities imposed on the other
ﬁrms. 11
11I disregard the possibility that advertising decreases aggregate demand for given price





∂pj < 0 (own eﬀects are stronger than cross eﬀects), it is










∂Ii > 0, the sign of dQ
dIi is indeterminate. In this case,
the overall eﬀect on quantity depends on the extent to which the direct
(expansion) eﬀect on aggregate demand is stronger than the indirect eﬀect
via prices.
To conclude this section on the marginal eﬀects of advertising, we draw
three main conclusions.
• When advertising has the eﬀect of lowering prices for any given level
of market demand (”informative advertising”) it has the unambiguous
eﬀect of increasing aggregate consumption.
• When advertising has the eﬀect of increasing prices for any given level
of market demand (”persuasive advertising”), its eﬀect on aggregate
consumption is a priori ambiguous. In particular, the larger the di-
rect eﬀect (that is the larger the expansion of market demand at given
prices) and the lower the impact of advertising on prices for given de-
mand, the more likely that advertising raises aggregate consumption.
• Other things being equal, it is less likely that aggregate consumption
decreases with advertising (that is, it is less likely that a ban raises
total demand) when products are sold by a monopolist than when they
are sold by oligopolistic ﬁrms. This is because the latter would not
internalise the negative externality that advertising might impose on
features of rival products. It might be that some consumers who cease to patronise the
rival good do not switch to the advertising ﬁrm’s products.
16other ﬁrms’ demands.12
Despite these reasonably general conclusions, the analysis above fails to
be complete for at least two reasons. First, it considers marginal changes of
advertising, while an advertising ban involves discrete changes. Second, it
says very little about the eﬀects that an advertising ban might have on the
ﬁrms’ proﬁts. This is an important topic, since it has been suggested that
the advertising game has often the features of a prisoners’ dilemma game (see
for instance Scherer (1980)), whereas one can often observe that companies
and trade associations are the main opponents of advertising bans. It would
then be useful to understand the impact of bans upon industry proﬁts.
In the next two sections, I specialise the analysis and resort to two models
to tackle the limitations of the general model set up above. Both models
present some novelty. In particular, they are constructed to illustrate the
importance of the expansion and price eﬀects of advertising whose key role
is showed to be crucial from the general analysis conducted in the present
section.
Because of the results obtained above, I shall focus in the remainder
of the paper on the more interesting cases of oligopoly and ”persuasive
advertising” (advertising raises prices).
12See also Dixit and Norman (1978) on this point.
173 First example: advertising increases product dif-
ferentiation
In this section I proceed to formulate a simple new model to study the issues
raised above.
3.1 Demand and advertising functions
To keep the formalisation in the simplest possible terms, I focus on a duopoly
example. The generalisation to n ﬁrms would be straightforward. The utility
of the consumer is given by the following quadratic function in the style of
Shubik and Levitan (1980) and Singh and Vives (1983):









where the parameters b1, b2 and g are aﬀected by advertising as described
below. The inverse demand functions are therefore:
pi = a − biqi − gqj, a > 0; bi > g > 0; i,j = 1,2;i 6= j. (13)
From which one can obtain the direct demand functions:
qi =
a(bj − g) − bjpi + gpj
bibj − g2 , i,j = 1,2;i 6= j. (14)
Note that at the symmetric equilibrium (bi = bj;pi = pj) aggregate
demand can be written as:




18The analysis in the previous section has shown that the extent to which
an investment increases aggregate demand for any given price level is crucial
for the determination of the eﬀect of advertising bans upon consumption.
Hence, one would like to have a parameter which measures such an eﬀect.
To do so, assume that the investment aﬀects the demand parameters in the
following way:
bi = ¯ b + lIj; g = ¯ g − Ii − Ij; Ii < ¯ g/2; l ∈ [0,2]; i,j = 1,2;i 6= j.
(16)
In the symmetric case Ii = Ij = I the impact of an increase of the





2(a − pi)(2 − l)
(¯ b + ¯ g + lI − 2I)2 ≥ 0. (17)
The parameter l is therefore an inverse measure of the ”expansion eﬀect”
of advertising upon aggregate consumption, since ∂Q
∂I is decreasing with l.
When l = 0, advertising expenditures give rise to the maximum expansion
of market demand. When l = 2, such an eﬀect is completely absent. In this
extreme case, advertising has the eﬀect of increasing the degree of product
diﬀerentiation without modifying the demand of consumers at given prices
(of course, market demand can still be indirectly aﬀected via price changes).
Note also the particular way in which advertising modiﬁes own and rival
ﬁrm’s demand. Advertising by ﬁrm i shifts outwards the own demand (g
decreases) but it also aﬀects ﬁrm j’s demand. This shifts outwards because
of the reduction of g but also rotates inwards around its intercept because
19of the increase in parameter bj. The magnitude of the latter eﬀect depends
on the parameter l. The higher l the more important the inward rotation
in ﬁrm j’s demand associated to a given outward shift in ﬁrm i’s demand.
Accordingly, higher values of l entail a lower expansion of aggregate demand.
Note however that the investment always contains an element of posi-
tive externality, since advertising reduces the parameter g and increases the
parameter bj, thus increasing the index of product diﬀerentiation which is
given by PD =
bibj
g2 and raising prices for both ﬁrms. 13 14 Therefore, (¯ b/¯ g)2
denotes the ex-ante degree of product diﬀerentiation, that is diﬀerentiation
in the absence of any advertising.
Note also that advertising by a ﬁrm tends to decrease the elasticity of
demand of both ﬁrms around a symmetric equilibrium. Indeed, it can be




−(¯ b + ¯ gl − lI)p





−(¯ b + lI)p
(¯ b − ¯ g + 2I + lI)2(a − p)
< 0.
(18)
The fact that advertising by a ﬁrm reduces the elasticity of demand of
13Note that in the standard Hotelling model of product diﬀerentiation it would be
impossible to carry out the same analysis I am doing here, since demand is perfectly
inelastic to prices and market demand is given. In such a model I could not identify a
parameter which measures the (direct) expansion of market demand caused by advertising,
nor I could account for the indirect eﬀect on demand via prices.
14To my knowledge, the most similar treatment to the one proposed here are to be
found in Cabrales and Motta (1996) and Rosenkranz (1996). In both papers, ﬁrms invest
to diminish the parameter g, giving rise to a pure externality eﬀect. The main diﬀerence
is that here advertising also aﬀects the parameter bj, which allows me to control for the
expansion eﬀect of demand. See also Vives (1990) for investments which modify demand
parameters in the linear demand model.
20the rival mainly depends on the increase in product diﬀerentiation caused
by advertising. Owing to the increase in product diﬀerentiation, advertising
always increases prices. Indeed, the term ∂pi
∂Ii +
∂pj
∂Ii which determines the
sign of the price eﬀect of advertising is always positive whatever the level of
the parameter l.
3.2 The game
Firms play a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst period they simultaneously choose
the levels of advertising. In the second period, they simultaneously choose
prices. We look for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
It is straightforward to compute the equilibrium prices, quantities and
proﬁts at the last stage of the game as follows:
p∗
i =
a(2bibj − big − g2)
4bibj − g2 ; (19)
q∗
i =
abj(2bibj − big − g2)




a2bj(2bibj − big − g2)2
(bibj − g2)(4bibj − g2)2; i,j = 1,2;i 6= j, (21)
where bi, bj and g are functions of advertising levels Ii and Ij as assumed
above.






To obtain internal solutions in the interval I ∈ [0, ¯ g
2), I assume that the ad-





0) = 0; C(Ii = 0) = 0; limIi→¯ g/2 C(Ii) = ∞; limIi→¯ g/2
dC(Ii)
dIi = ∞.
21Before characterising the equilibrium, however, let us study the ag-
gregate quantity sold in the market. By focusing on the symmetric case
Ii = Ij = I and bi = bj = b and substituting p∗




(b + g)(2b − g)
=
2a(¯ b + lI)
(¯ b + ¯ g + I(l − 2))(2¯ b − ¯ g + 2I(l + 1))
. (22)
Since our objective is to study whether an advertising ban reduces or
increases aggregate consumption, it is useful to deﬁne the function ∆Q ≡
Q(I) − Q(I = 0), where Q(I = 0) = 2a¯ b
(¯ b+¯ g)(2¯ b−¯ g) is the total quantity sold
under a complete advertising ban.
The sign of ∆Q is crucial to understand the eﬀect of a ban upon con-
sumption. To study its sign, write the function I∆Q=0 which solves ∆Q = 0
as:
I∆Q=0 =
2¯ b2(l − 1) + ¯ g(4¯ b + ¯ gl)
2¯ b(2 + l − l2)
. (23)
It is straightforward to check the following:
• Remark 1. At l = 0, I∆Q=0 = −(¯ b − 2¯ g), which is non-negative for
¯ b ≤ 2¯ g.
• Remark 2. At l = 2, I∆Q=0 → ∞.
• Remark 3. The function I∆Q=0 is increasing in the plan (l,I), since:
∂I∆Q=0
∂l = 6¯ b2−4¯ b¯ g+2¯ g2−4¯ b2l+8¯ b¯ gl+2¯ bl2+¯ g2l2
2¯ b(2+l−l2)2 > 0.
• Remark 4. In the plan (l,I) the function I∆Q=0 shifts to the right
when ¯ b increases and when ¯ g decreases.
22Indeed:
∂I∆Q=0
∂¯ b = −
2¯ b2(1−l)+¯ g2l
2¯ b2(2+l−l2) is negative on all the relevant domain,
since the function I∆Q=0 makes sense only for l ∈ [0,1 − ¯ g
¯ b). Outside
this interval, a ﬁrm’s advertising expenditures I would exceed ¯ g/2,
which is excluded by assumption.
Also:
∂I∆Q=0
∂¯ g = − 2¯ b+¯ gl
¯ b2(2+l−l2) > 0.
The curve I∆Q=0 is drawn in Figure 1 for given values of the parameters
¯ b and ¯ g. The ﬁgure also shows that higher (lower) values of ¯ b (¯ g) holding
ﬁxed the other parameter would shift the curve to the right.
This ﬁgure helps us understand the eﬀects of a ban. Imagine for instance
that the equilibrium value I∗ lies to the right of the curve I∆Q=0. This would
imply that Q(I∗) < Q(0). In other words, the ban would increase aggregate
consumption. One can then apply the same argument to interpret remarks
1 and 2 above.
Remark 2 tells us that no matter which equilibrium level of advertising
occurs at equilibrium when l = 2, that is when advertising does not have any
eﬀect on aggregate consumption for given price levels, an advertising ban
would always increase aggregate consumption. This is because whatever
I∗ will always fall in the area where the inequality Q(I∗) < Q(0) holds.
Remark 1 is of less straightforward interpretation, since the position of
the curve at l = 0 depends on the values of the parameters ¯ b and ¯ g. We can
identify two cases:
• ¯ b > 2¯ g.
In this case the equilibrium level of advertising I∗ > 0 would always
fall in an area where Q(I∗) > Q(0). Hence, an advertising ban would
certainly reduce consumption.
23• ¯ b ≤ 2¯ g.
Here we have two possibilities: either the actual equilibrium value I∗
lies above the curve I∆Q=0, in which case a ban reduces aggregate
consumption; or it lies below the curve, in which case a ban increases
aggregate consumption. This uncertainty can be resolved only by ﬁnd-
ing the actual equilibrium value I∗.15
The previous analysis conﬁrms the role played by the direct eﬀect of ad-
vertising on market demand expansion (inversely related to the parameter
l) in determining the sign an advertising ban has upon aggregate consump-
tion. As a ﬁrst result, we have seen that when l is large enough (that is,
when the expansion eﬀect of advertising is weak enough) an advertising ban
increases consumption. To complete our analysis, let us turn to the study
of equilibrium advertising expenditures.
3.3 Specifying the cost function: Equilibrium solutions






(¯ g/2) − Ii
−
Ii
(¯ g/2)2), k ≥ 0. (24)
This function satisﬁes the properties required above for getting interior
solutions in the interval 0 ≤ Ii < ¯ g/2.
With such a cost function (but also with other simpler convex functions)
solutions can be found only with the help of a computer programme. Figure
15However, note that for ¯ b → ¯ g one has I∆Q=0 → ¯ g/2. This means that when goods
are ex-ante homogenous the locus of the equilibrium levels of advertising will always lie
below the curve I∆Q=0.
241 illustrates the symmetric equilibrium I∗ as a function of l.16
The curves have been drawn for values of ¯ b as speciﬁed in the ﬁgure,
and for the following values of the parameters: ¯ g = 2 (so that advertising
investments are normalised to be between 0 and 1), k = 1, a = 10. I hold
these values ﬁxed for all the numerical solutions without any major loss for
the analysis. Indeed, ¯ g aﬀects the results only when it changes with respect
to ¯ b, so that the eﬀect of a decrease in ¯ g upon the equilibrium solutions is
identical to the eﬀect of an increase in ¯ b. The parameter k enters multiplica-
tively the cost function, and its eﬀect on the equilibrium level of advertising
is therefore straightforward: when k rises, marginal costs of advertising also
rise, and the locus of the equilibrium points shifts downwards. As for pa-
rameter a, it enters multiplicatively the gross proﬁt function. An increase
in a would therefore shift the equilibrium locus upwards.
A priori, it is not clear what is the eﬀect of an increase in l upon the
equilibrium values of advertising. On the one hand, an increase in l means
that fewer new consumers are attracted into the market, which lowers the
incentive to invest in advertising. On the other hand, l is also a measure
of the negative externality imposed upon the rival ﬁrm. Other things being
16By resorting to numerical solutions one can also check that a ﬁrm never has the









j ). To understand why this outcome is not surprising one might think of what
happens in a Hotelling-type model. There, ﬁrms located at the centre would move towards
the extreme of the line to relax market competition independently of the position of the
rival, although by doing so individual demand may decrease. In the model presented here,
not only there is the incentive to advertise to relax competition, but also by doing so there
is no adverse eﬀect on individual demand. In fact, when l > 0, advertising expenditures
improve the competitive position of the ﬁrm.
25equal, a higher l means that an additional unit of advertising expenditures
entails a wider inward rotation of the demand curve of the rival. This creates
a stronger incentive to invest since it increases proﬁtability. This ambiguity
is reﬂected in the fact that I∗ is negatively sloped for ex-ante more similar
goods (¯ b closer to ¯ g) but positively sloped when goods are already highly
diﬀerentiated in the absence of advertising.
An increase in ¯ b makes the curve shifts downwards. This is because for
any given ¯ g, a higher ¯ b implies a rise in the ”ex-ante” index of product
diﬀerentiation (i.e. the degree to which products are diﬀerentiated when
advertising does not exist). In turn, this reduces the incentive to increase
product diﬀerentiation and therefore lowers the optimal value of investment
in advertising. Likewise, when ¯ g decreases with respect to ¯ b, this increases
ex-ante diﬀerentiation and creates less incentive to spend in advertising to
further diﬀerentiate the competing brands.
This result clearly contrasts with the well-known Dorfman-Steiner (1954)
theorem, according to which advertising increases with the ﬁrm’s market
power. Here it is the opposite, since ﬁrms advertise precisely to increase
their market power, and such an incentive is the stronger the lower the mar-
ket power they have (that is, the more homogenous the goods).17
The intersection between the curves I∗ and I∆Q=0, which occurs at l = ˜ l
(see Fig. 1) is crucial:
• If ˜ l < 0, a complete advertising ban increases aggregate consumption
∀l.
17See also Becker and Murphy (1993) for a critique of the Dorfman-Steiner’s theorem.
26• If ˜ l ≥ 0, then:
– For l ∈ [0,˜ l] a complete ban decreases aggregate consumption.
– For l ∈ (˜ l,2] a complete ban increases aggregate consumption.
Indeed, for l ∈ [0,˜ l], the equilibrium level of advertising lies above the
curve I∆Q=0, implying that Q(I∗) is bigger than Q(0). That is, the total
quantity sold at the unconstrained equilibrium is larger than is the total
quantity sold under a ban on advertising. For l ∈ (˜ l,2], the opposite hap-
pens.
The ﬁgure also illustrates that when the ex-ante degree of product dif-
ferentiation rises (¯ b increases with respect to ¯ g), the intersection between
the two curves moves to the right. This means that it is less likely that
an advertising ban has the undesired eﬀect of increasing total consumption
when products are ex-ante diﬀerentiated. Instead, products whose diﬀerent
brands are hardly distinguishable in the absence of labeling and brand-name
ﬁdelity are more likely than others to be associated with a rise in consump-
tion after an advertising ban. 18
To ﬁnd the eﬀect of the bans on proﬁts, I follow a similar procedure
as the one used to uncovering the eﬀect upon consumption. Deﬁne the
function ∆π ≡ π(I) − π(0), where π(I) is a ﬁrm’s proﬁt at a symmetric
level of advertising expenditures and π(0) a ﬁrm’s proﬁt under a ban. By
substitution into the second stage proﬁt, this function can be written:
18Cigarettes and colas would probably be good examples of ”ex-ante” homogenous prod-
ucts. Results of blind-tests usually show that consumers are unable to make out their
favourite brand from rival ones.
27∆π =
a2(¯ b + lI)(¯ b − ¯ g + I + lI)
(2¯ b − ¯ g + 2I + 2lI)2(¯ b + ¯ g − 2I + lI)
−
8kI2
¯ g2(¯ g − 2I)
−
a2¯ b(¯ b − ¯ g)
4¯ b3 − 3¯ b¯ g2 + ¯ g3.
(25)
Figure 2 draws the function I∆π=0 in the plan (l,I). Below the curve,
π(I) is higher than π(0). Above it, the opposite. The same ﬁgure also shows
the locus I∗ of the equilibrium solutions of the game. For low values of ¯ b with
respect to ¯ g, the curve I∆π=0 lies above the equilibrium schedule, implying
that ﬁrms are always worse oﬀ under an advertising ban. It is only when
¯ b becomes very high relative to ¯ g that the ban might give higher proﬁts to
the ﬁrms. However, this occurs only for relatively high values of l, that is
when the expansion eﬀect is low enough. Said otherwise, an advertising ban
might be beneﬁcial to the ﬁrms only if they produce goods which are already
highly ex-ante diﬀerentiated and if advertising expenditures are not likely
to increase aggregate demand but rather to shift consumers across ﬁrms.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Advertising in this model plays
a twofold role. First, it relaxes market competition between ﬁrms. Second,
it increases aggregate demand at given prices. When products are already
highly diﬀerentiated, there is little beneﬁt from advertising as a way to relax
market competition. When aggregate demand reacts little to advertising
and mainly reshuﬄes market shares between ﬁrms, advertising expenditures
are collectively damaging. The combination of these two elements gives the
result above.19
19If advertising expenditures aﬀected demand parameters as bi = ¯ b + lIi, then the
business-stealing eﬀect of advertising would disappear, and the positive price externality
would be dominant. In this case, it is possible to show that the ban still increases con-
sumption in a similar way as showed here but the ﬁrms’ proﬁts would never increase under
284 A second example
In this section, I study a model - inspired by Friedman (1983) - where
advertising raises the willingness to pay of consumers without aﬀecting the
degree of product diﬀerentiation between goods. I keep the example as close
as possible to the previous one but some changes are necessary. Assume the
following utility function:








) − gq1q2. (26)
The inverse demand functions are:
pi = ai − bqi − gqj, ai > 0; b > g > 0; i,j = 1,2;i 6= j. (27)
Direct demand functions are given by:
qi =
aib − ajg − bpi + gpj
b2 − g2 , i,j = 1,2;i 6= j. (28)
At the symmetric equilibrium (ai = aj;pi = pj) aggregate demand is:
Q = q1 + q2 =
ai−pi
b+g .
Assume that advertising expenditures aﬀect demand parameters as fol-
lows:
ai = ¯ a + Ii + eIj; e ∈ [−1,1]; i,j = 1,2; i 6= j. (29)
In the symmetric case Ii = Ij = I the parameter e is a direct measure




¯ b2−¯ g2 ≥ 0. Note that for e = −1 one has a case of perfect ”business-
stealing”, since a ﬁrm’s advertising attracts to it only consumers who would
otherwise buy from the other ﬁrm.20
An additional unit of advertising expenditure by ﬁrm i shifts outward
the own demand curve while the externality upon the rival ﬁrm depends on
whether e > 0 (ﬁrm j’s curve shifts outwards) or e < 0 (the curve shifts
inwards).21
Advertising decreases the ﬁrm’s own demand elasticity around a sym-
metric solution, since ∂²i
∂Ii = −
b(b−eg)p
(b−g)2(¯ a+I+eI−p)2 < 0. However, the impact of




(b−g)2(¯ a+I+eI−p)2, which is positive for e > g/b. In particular,
when e < 0 advertising makes the rival ﬁrm’s demand more elastic.
Firms play the same two-stage game as in the previous section. They
simultaneously decide advertising expenditures at the ﬁrst stage and prices
at the second. Equilibrium values at the last stage are given by:
pi =
2aib2 − ajbg − aig2
4b2 − g2 ; qi =
b(2aib2 − ajbg − aig2)
4b4 − 5b2g2 + g4 ; i,j = 1,2;i 6= j;
(30)
where ai,aj are functions of Ii and Ij as assumed above.
Since the proﬁt function is quadratic in Ii, assume a cubic cost function
of advertising: Ci = k
I3
i
3 . The net proﬁt function at the ﬁrst stage of the
game is therefore:
20I disregard e < −1 which would imply that advertising hurts the rival more than it
beneﬁts the advertising ﬁrm.
21See Friedman (1983) for a similar treatment of advertising externalities.
30πi = b
(2b2 − g2 − bg)2(¯ a + Ii + eIj)2











2 − bge)(1 + e)
(2b − g)2(2b2 + 3bg + g2)k
+
p
2¯ ab(2b − g)2(2b2 + 3bg + g2)k(2b2 + 3bg − bge) + b2(2b2 − g2 − bge)2(1 + e)2
(2b − g)2(2b2 + 3bg + g2)k
. (32)
It can be checked that the second order conditions are satisﬁed at I =
I∗. Note that the equilibrium level of advertising investment raises with
¯ a and decreases with k since the former increases marginal revenue from
advertising and the latter increases the marginal cost of it. How equilibrium
advertising varies with respect to the expansion eﬀect parameter e and the
degree of product diﬀerentiation b/g is less straightforward.
A rise in e has two eﬀects. First, it implies that an additional unit
of advertising expands market demand more strongly. On the other hand,
however, it also implies that there is a higher positive spillover on the rival
ﬁrm’s demand. While the former eﬀect increases the incentive to invest, the
second decreases it. Nevertheless, advertising is discouraged by the exis-
tence of a positive spillover only to the extent that ﬁrms are supplying close
substitutes (in the extreme case where g = 0 the goods are independent:
ﬁrms do not care if their advertising beneﬁts the rivals). Therefore, the
more diﬀerentiated the goods (the lower g with respect to b) and the less
important the discouraging eﬀect of the spillovers with respect to the eﬀect
of expanding demand at given prices. As a consequence, the I∗ scheduled
is positively sloped for low values of g and negatively sloped for relatively
high values of g. This is also illustrated by Figure 3.
31As for the relationship between advertising restrictions and consumption,
the following result holds true in this model:
• Remark 5 An advertising ban always decreases consumption.
• Proof. Deﬁne ∆Q ≡ Q(I) − Q(0), where Q(I) is quantity sold at a
symmetric choice of advertising (and price) levels (not necessarily the
equilibrium values). It is easy to check that:
∆Q =
2bI(1+e)
(2b2+bg−g2) ≥ 0 for e ≥ −1. This means that independently
of the expansion eﬀect, the quantity supplied under the ban is always
(weakly) lower than the quantity supplied under any positive level of
(symmetric) advertising expenditures.
The result above contrasts with the one obtained in the previous section
where advertising bans might or not have increased consumption according
to the magnitude of the expansion eﬀect of advertising upon demand. Two
remarks are useful to better understand this result and reconcile it with the
result obtained in the previous section.
Firstly, the expansion eﬀect still plays a role here, because the eﬀec-
tiveness of an advertising ban in discouraging consumption is dependent on
the parameter e which measures the expansion eﬀect of advertising at given
prices. Indeed, in the extreme case where e = −1, the ban does not have
any eﬀect on aggregate demand.
Secondly, the preliminary analysis carried out in section 2 has empha-
sised the relevance of the price eﬀect of advertising and this is the main
element of explanation of the two diﬀerent results. In the model analysed
in section 3, advertising had a strong impact upon prices since it increased
32product diﬀerentiation. Advertising had some features of a public good for
the industry as a whole since it allowed products to be perceived as distinct
and ﬁrms to command higher prices. In the model dealt with in this section,
this feature disappears and the price eﬀect of advertising becomes smaller
as e decreases, implying that the lower the market expansion eﬀect of ad-
vertising the lower the price eﬀect as well. This can better understood by
analysing the price eﬀect of advertising as expressed in section 2. The sign
and magnitude of the price eﬀect depend on ∂pi/∂Ii+∂pi/∂Ii, which in this





















(1 + e)(2b2 − g2 − bg)
4b2 − g2 . (33)
The magnitude of this eﬀect rises with e. In particular, when e = −1
advertising increases own prices by exactly the same amount as it decreases
the rival’s price. In this extreme case, therefore, advertising does not aﬀect
equilibrium prices at all at any symmetric equilibrium. This explains why
the ban does not increase consumption even in the extreme situation where
there exists only business stealing, with no expansion eﬀect of advertising
(e = −1).
Figure 3 illustrates the eﬀects of an advertising ban upon the ﬁrms’
proﬁts. Two pairs of curves are drawn for each of two diﬀerent values of the
parameter g. The curve I∗ shows the equilibrium levels of investments in
advertising. The curve ∆π = 0 illustrates the locus of the points for which
the proﬁt under a symmetric advertising level is equal to the proﬁt under a
ban. Formally:
33∆π = π(I)−π(0) =
b(b − g)(¯ a + I(1 + e))2




¯ a2b(b − g)
4b3 − 3bg2 + g3. (34)
Above the curve ∆π = 0 the proﬁts earned by ﬁrms investing a common
level I of advertising is lower than under a ban which imposes I = 0. Below
the curve, the opposite occurs. The value ˆ e at which the two curves intersect
is the critical threshold value. For e ∈ [−1, ˆ e] the ﬁrms would gain from the
imposition of an advertising ban. For e ∈ (ˆ e,1], their proﬁts would decrease
under a ban.
An implication of this model is that if ﬁrms said that the only eﬀect
of advertising is to move market shares across ﬁrms without aﬀecting total
demand, then this situation is described by e = −1. Hence, we would fall in
an area where the ﬁrms’ proﬁts increase with the ban: they should be the
keenest group in advocating an advertising ban.22
When product diﬀerentiation rises (b/g increases) the intersection point
ˆ e moves to the left, thus leaving a narrower interval for which the ban would
beneﬁt the ﬁrms. The opposite occurred in the model presented in section
3.
Comparing these results with those obtained in section 3, two points can
be noted. The ﬁrst is that in both models the expansion eﬀect plays a role
in determining the eﬀects of a ban upon proﬁts. Indeed, the stronger the
expansion eﬀect of advertising (the lower l in the previous model; the higher
e in the present one) the more likely that the ﬁrms would oppose to a ban.
22Although less clearcut, the previous section model also implied that if advertising is
of the ”business-stealing” type (l closer to 2) then the ban is more likely to raise proﬁts
of the ﬁrms.
34The second is that - as stressed above - advertising is related to product
diﬀerentiation in a diﬀerent way in the two models. In the ﬁrst one adver-
tising is carried out to increase product diﬀerentiation and it is the more
beneﬁcial the less (ex-ante) diﬀerentiated the goods. In the second model,
the eﬀect is inverted, since the higher product diﬀerentiation the higher the
proﬁtability of advertising expenditures, as can be seen from the upward
shift in the schedule ∆π = 0 as g decreases. 23 Unlike the ﬁrst model,
this is consistent with the Dorfman-Steiner’s condition: here market power
increases the marginal revenue from advertising, thus raising the incentive
to engage in such expenditures.
In turn, the diﬀerent way in which advertising aﬀects product diﬀerenti-
ation explains the diﬀerent results as to the desirability of the ban from the
point of view of the ﬁrms when ex-ante product diﬀerentiation rises.
5 Conclusions
The main object of this paper has been to analyse the impact of an adver-
tising ban on total consumption. A general model has served to emphasise
that two eﬀects are crucial in determining such an impact. The ﬁrst ef-
fect relates to the extent to which advertising expands aggregate demand
at given prices. The second consists of the way in which advertising aﬀects
prices for any given level of demand. In particular, an advertising ban is
more likely to increase total consumption when advertising expenditures
23Note that the eﬀect of product diﬀerentiation upon equilibrium advertising levels was
ambiguous because ﬁrms take into account the marginal eﬀect of advertising upon own
proﬁts only. Ex-post, though, a ﬁrm beneﬁts from the spillover of advertising carried out
by the rival ﬁrm.
35do not expand the total market but rather shift market shares across ﬁrms;
and when prices increase in a considerable manner due to advertising. When
advertising decreases prices, as is the case for informative advertising, a ban
would always decrease consumption.
I have then proceeded to illustrate these main ﬁndings with the help of
two speciﬁc duopoly models which have also allowed me to discuss the eﬀects
of an advertising ban upon the proﬁts of the ﬁrms. I have showed that a
ban might increase ﬁrms’ proﬁts, and that this is more likely to occur when
the expansion eﬀect of advertising is weak enough (that is, when advertising
mostly redistributes market shares among ﬁrms). Although I believe that
these ﬁndings are quite general there are a number of features in this paper
which are admittedly special and which would deserve some comments.
• Entry. Throughout the paper I have considered only the case of
an exogenously given number of ﬁrms 24. However, one might be
interested in studying how the ban aﬀects the number of ﬁrms which
would coexist in the industry at equilibrium. Dixit and Norman (1978)
have found that it is not possible to establish a priori whether more
advertising allows more or fewer ﬁrms to operate in the industry. In
general, I would expect the answer to depend on a number of variables,
among which the relative importance of the expansion and price eﬀects
mentioned above.
• Asymmetry. I have not departed from the assumption of symme-
try, which is very convenient but also very strong. Again, I feel that
24In the speciﬁc models of section 3 and 4 I have analysed a duopoly but the results
carry over to a number n of oligopolists without diﬃculties.
36many insights would still apply to a situation where ﬁrms diﬀer in their
technologies and initial market positions. However, there are a number
of interesting issues which arise under asymmetry and which only an
accurate analysis might properly address. In particular, it would be
interesting to understand which kind of ﬁrms is more likely (if at all)
to beneﬁt from the introduction of a ban. An interesting application
could be given by the tobacco industry in the European Union. In
many countries tobacco has been heavily regulated and state monop-
olies have existed for a long time. If outsiders can gain market shares
mostly or uniquely through advertising, and if big multinationals are
more eﬃcient in their advertising activities than the local monopolies
(in terms of the models above, the incumbent would have a higher
advertising cost parameter k than the entrants), then the ban would
protect the state monopolies (insiders) and hurt the big multinational
ﬁrms (outsiders). 25
• Quantity competition. In the paper I have focused on price com-
petition, both in the general model and in the speciﬁc examples. This
allowed me to illustrate the expansion and price eﬀects of advertis-
ing more neatly. None the less, the basic insights of the analysis can
be reproduced in a model where the ﬁrms’ strategic variable at the
product market competition stage is quantity rather than price. Al-
though I do not reproduce them for shortness, it is easy to check that
25This argument has been suggested by commentators who noted that strict bans were
enforced in Portugal, Italy and France, where state monopolies are strong. This might
also imply that the true government objective would not be a decrease in consumption,
but for instance a welfare function where the national proﬁts have a considerable weight.
37the qualitative results obtained in the models proposed in sections 3
and 4 still hold good under the hypothesis of quantity competition.
26 Furthermore, there would have been no reason to suspect that
the mode of market competition sensitively aﬀects the result. Indeed,
Dixit and Norman (1978) ﬁnd that advertising does not necessarily
increase quantity in a model where ﬁrms compete on quantities.
• Partial equilibrium. By focusing on a partial equilibrium model,
I cannot capture the eﬀects of a ban on other sectors. In particu-
lar, some commentators (and lobbyists) claim that a ban would have
the strongest eﬀects upon newspapers, radio and television channels
whose revenues are highly dependent on the advertising space sold to
the ﬁrms. Neither this, nor other general equilibrium eﬀects can be
captured in the framework of analysis proposed here.
• Advertising as capital assets. The best way to describe advertis-
ing expenditures is possibly in looking at them as investments which
contribute to create a stock of goodwill. Within this perspective, an
advertising ban would not have an immediate eﬀect upon consumption
and proﬁts, since the willingness to pay of consumers would decrease
only over time. This should obviously taken into account in an empiri-
cal work. Although the paper does not account for the delayed impact
of a ban, it does capture the long-run eﬀects of it. The formulation
proposed here would be equivalent to the comparative statics between
26Details are available from the author upon request. One of the advantages of the mod-
els presented above is that it is possible to analyse both price and quantity competition,
a property not always shared by many models of product diﬀerentiation.
38long-run equilibria in a more sophisticated model where advertising
acts as a capital asset.
• Switching costs For many products such as tobacco and alcohol it is
conceivable that advertising is mostly directed towards young people
who are not usual consumers. This would amount to assuming that
there are two generations of consumers, one which has already con-
sumed the good in the past and incurs costs of switching from a brand
to another; and a second generation which has no switching costs.
Some of these eﬀects are partly captured by the model presented here.
In particular, the magnitude of the expansion eﬀect is related to the
importance of the generation of ”new” consumers. However, the full
consequences of such a framework of analysis could be properly inves-
tigated only within a model where switching costs, or the existence of
two generations with diﬀering preferences, are rigorously modeled.
• Welfare. Throughout the paper I have focused on the eﬀects of an
advertising ban on total consumption. This is partly to avoid the is-
sue of how advertising enters the utility functions of consumers, 27 but
also because it does seem a real concern for governments that total
consumption of certain goods such as tobacco and alcohol should be
reduced. In many circumstances reduction of consumption is the main
objective of a government, and this can be rationalised by assuming
a welfare function where negative externalities due to consumption of
the product play a determinant role. In many other cases, governments
are probably maximising an objective function where externalities are
27See Dixit and Norman (1978) for such an analysis.
39just one of the terms along with consumer surplus, tax revenue con-
siderations and proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrms.
• Taxes and other instruments. Even considering that externali-
ties are judged so important by the government for the reduction in
consumption to dominate any other term in the welfare function, my
analysis has been restrictive in that I have considered just one of the
many instruments available to a government which wants to reduce
consumption. For instance, a consumption tax increase might be the
best instrument to meet such a goal. However, higher taxes often en-
courage contraband. Insofar as smuggling from neighbouring countries
might be increased by a tax level beyond a certain threshold, it is pos-
sible that this introduces cheaper units of the good in the market, thus
countering the reduction in consumption. The same is true for total
prohibition on consumption of a given good which might stimulate
the existence of a parallel market on which the authorities have little
control. These are also interesting issues which should be analysed in
a formal framework.
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Figure 1 - Eﬀect of the ban on aggregate quantity. First model.
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Figure 2 - Eﬀect of the ban on proﬁts. First model.
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Figure 3 - Eﬀect of the ban on proﬁts. Second model.
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